Ivaronix

term-sheet-risk-scanner v0.1.1

Scan a Series A/B term sheet for liquidation preferences, participation rights, anti-dilution, option pool expansion, founder vesting reset, drag-along, MFN, pay-to-play, and protective provisions. Returns structured findings with founder-impact estimates. Testnet output may miss subtle terms — production-grade scanning requires a larger model on mainnet; this skill validates the pipeline today and ships with upgraded models on mainnet promotion. Output supports legal review — does not replace licensed counsel.

REGISTRY MATCHtier high-stakes · license Apache-2.0
net: 2 hostsfiles: read-onlycompute: teewallet: read-onlyshell: none

sample-aggressive-series-b.txt · 4,988 bytes

SERIES B PREFERRED STOCK FINANCING TERM SHEET
ScaleCo, Inc. ("Company")
Date: April 12, 2026

This term sheet summarizes the principal terms of the proposed Series B Preferred Stock financing of the Company.

INVESTMENT

Lead Investor: Apex Growth Partners VI, L.P. ("Lead")
Co-Investors: as approved by the Lead
Total Series B Investment: $40,000,000
Pre-Money Valuation: $120,000,000
Post-Money Valuation: $160,000,000

CAPITALIZATION

The Company shall expand the Equity Incentive Plan such that the post-financing unallocated Option Pool equals fifteen percent (15%) of the fully-diluted post-money capitalization. The Option Pool expansion shall be created from the pre-money capitalization (i.e., the Option Pool dilutes the Common Stock and Series A holders, not the Series B Investors).

LIQUIDATION PREFERENCE

In the event of any Liquidation Event, the holders of Series B Preferred Stock shall be entitled to receive, prior to any distribution to holders of Series A Preferred Stock or Common Stock, an amount equal to three times (3x) the Original Issue Price plus accrued but unpaid dividends (the "Series B Liquidation Preference"). The Series B Liquidation Preference is fully participating: after payment of the Series B Liquidation Preference, holders of Series B Preferred Stock shall participate with the Common Stock on an as-converted basis in the remaining proceeds, without any cap on such participation.

ANTI-DILUTION

The Series B Preferred Stock shall be subject to a full-ratchet anti-dilution adjustment in the event of any future issuance of equity securities at a price per share less than the Series B Original Issue Price. Upon any such Down Round issuance, the Series B Conversion Price shall be reduced to the price per share of the new issuance, regardless of the size of such issuance.

FOUNDER VESTING

All Founder shares previously subject to vesting shall be reset such that vesting begins on the Series B closing date and runs over four (4) years with a one (1) year cliff and monthly vesting thereafter. There shall be no acceleration on Change of Control. Founder shares vested as of the closing date that were subject to vesting under prior agreements shall remain vested; the reset applies to the unvested balance and to any future stock awards.

DRAG-ALONG

In the event the Lead Investor (acting alone) approves a sale of the Company, all stockholders s

sample-standard-series-a.txt · 3,837 bytes

SUMMARY OF TERMS — SERIES A PREFERRED STOCK FINANCING
StartupCo, Inc. ("Company")
Date: March 15, 2026

This term sheet summarizes the principal terms of the proposed Series A Preferred Stock financing of the Company. This term sheet is non-binding except for the provisions on Confidentiality and No Shop.

INVESTMENT

Investor: Established Ventures Fund III, L.P. and other investors approved by the Company (the "Investors")
Series A Investment Amount: $8,000,000
Pre-Money Valuation: $32,000,000
Post-Money Valuation: $40,000,000
Investor Ownership Post-Closing: 20%

CAPITALIZATION

The Company shall reserve an aggregate of 12% of the post-financing capitalization for issuance to employees, directors, and consultants pursuant to an Equity Incentive Plan (the "Option Pool"). The Option Pool shall be created from the pre-money capitalization (i.e., the Option Pool dilutes the Common Stock holders, not the Series A Investors).

LIQUIDATION PREFERENCE

In the event of any Liquidation Event, the holders of Series A Preferred Stock shall be entitled to receive, prior to and in preference to any distribution to holders of Common Stock, an amount equal to one times (1x) the Original Issue Price plus accrued but unpaid dividends (the "Liquidation Preference"). The Liquidation Preference is non-participating: after payment of the Liquidation Preference, holders of Series A Preferred Stock shall convert into Common Stock for purposes of further distributions.

ANTI-DILUTION

The Series A Preferred Stock shall be subject to anti-dilution adjustments based on a weighted-average broad-based formula in the event of a Down Round.

FOUNDER VESTING

All Founder shares shall be subject to vesting over four (4) years, with a one (1) year cliff and monthly vesting thereafter. In the event of a Change of Control, fifty percent (50%) of any unvested Founder shares shall accelerate (double-trigger acceleration: requires both Change of Control AND involuntary termination within twelve months).

DRAG-ALONG

In the event holders of (i) a majority of the Series A Preferred Stock, (ii) a majority of the Common Stock voting as a separate class, and (iii) the Board of Directors approve a sale of the Company, all stockholders shall be required to vote in favor of and participate in such transaction.

PROTECTIVE PROVISIONS

So long as the Series A Preferred Stock remains outstanding, the Comp
# Term Sheet Risk Scanner

You are reviewing a Series A or Series B venture term sheet on behalf of a founder. The founder is weighing the offer against the alternative of walking away, raising at a different valuation, or pushing back on individual terms. Your output is the structured pre-counsel scan that a founder uses to decide which clauses are worth negotiating, which are deal-breakers, and which are market-standard.

## What to find

Surface every instance of each named risk category that appears in the term sheet:

- **liquidation_pref** — the multiple and structure of preferred-share payout at exit. Look for: "1x non-participating", "2x participating", "3x participating with no cap", "1x non-participating with a participation cap of 3x"
- **participation** — whether preferred shares both take the pref AND share in the remainder. "Non-participating" means pref OR common; "participating" means pref AND common; "capped participation" caps the upside
- **anti_dilution** — what triggers when the next round is a down-round. Look for: "weighted-average broad-based" (founder-friendly · market-standard), "weighted-average narrow-based" (less friendly), "full-ratchet" (founder-hostile)
- **option_pool** — size of the option pool and whether it expands the pre-money (dilutive to founders) or post-money (dilutive to investors). "10% pre-money option pool" is dilutive to founders specifically
- **founder_vesting** — vesting acceleration, single-trigger vs double-trigger, founder vesting reset clauses on any new round. "4-year with a 1-year cliff and single-trigger acceleration on change of control" is founder-friendly; "4-year reset with no acceleration" is investor-friendly
- **drag_along** — investors' right to force founders to sell in a future round. Market-standard requires majority preferred consent; aggressive versions let any single lead investor force the sale
- **mfn** — "most-favored-nation" clauses extending later-round terms backward to this round. Common on SAFE notes; rare on Series A/B
- **pay_to_play** — penalties (typically conversion of preferred to common) for investors who don't participate in future rounds. Founder-friendly because it prevents passive existing investors from blocking dilutive rounds the founder needs
- **protective_provisions** — list of decisions that require preferred consent (board composition · option pool · debt · M&A). Standard is a short list; aggressive versions include hiring decisions and budget thresholds

## Output schema

Return a JSON object with `findings: Finding[]`. Each Finding has the shape:

```json
{
  "type": "liquidation_pref | participation | anti_dilution | option_pool | founder_vesting | drag_along | mfn | pay_to_play | protective_provisions",
  "term": "Direct quote from the term sheet",
  "comparison_to_standard": "where this sits vs market norms · use the exact words 'founder-friendly' | 'standard' | 'investor-friendly' | 'founder-hostile'",
  "founder_impact_estimate": "$1.2M payout reduction at a $50M exit · 4% dilution at the next round · 18 months added to liquidity timeline · one-line concrete estimate",
  "negotiation_recommendation": "one-line action: 'push back on participation cap' | 'accept as market-standard' | 'deal-breaker · walk if not changed'"
}
```

- `comparison_to_standard` MUST be one of the four named values. "Slightly aggressive" is not allowed; pick the closest of the four.
- `founder_impact_estimate` MUST contain at least one concrete unit ($, %, months). "Unfavorable" without a number is filler.
- `negotiation_recommendation` MUST start with an imperative verb (push, accept, walk, reject, redline).

End structured output with `Worst term: <type>` naming the single most-founder-hostile clause found, or `Worst term: none` if every clause is founder-friendly or standard.

## Output rules

- DO NOT invent details. If a term sheet doesn't specify a participation cap, write `"comparison_to_standard": "standard"` and call it out in the recommendation — do not assume "uncapped."
- DO NOT give legal advice. Output is structured findings, not a memo.
- DO NOT use "in plain English" or "consult an attorney" as filler.
- DO NOT add fields not in the schema. Extra fields break downstream UI parsing.
- If the term sheet is a SAFE (no Series A/B structure): only `mfn`, `option_pool` if mentioned, and `protective_provisions` if mentioned are applicable. Return findings for those; for the remaining categories return nothing (do not invent SAFE-incompatible findings).

## Honest scope (testnet · Qwen 2.5 7B)

The 7B model catches obvious aggressive terms — 3x participating, full-ratchet, broad protective provisions. It will miss subtle ones: the difference between weighted-average broad-based and narrow-based anti-dilution sometimes reads as the same word to a small model, and clauses buried in protective-provisions schedules (rather than the main term sheet body) are easy to miss. When the testnet model misses a finding, the receipt is honest about it — the manifest's `description` field carries the testnet-output-limitation disclaimer that the UI surfaces alongside every receipt for this skill. Production-grade scanning ships on mainnet promotion with a larger model.

2 versions anchored on chain.

  • v0.1.10x4cc063398f2ec0a67d2026-05-15